The British University in Egypt

BUE Scholar
Economics

Business Administration, Economics and
Political Science

Spring 9-1-2021

Capital structure and political connections: evidence from GCC
banks and the financial crisis
Fatma Ahmed
fatma.ehab@bue.edu.eg

David Macmillan
University of Stirling, david.mcmillan@stir.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://buescholar.bue.edu.eg/econ
Part of the Finance Commons

Recommended Citation
Ahmed, Fatma and Macmillan, David, "Capital structure and political connections: evidence from GCC
banks and the financial crisis" (2021). Economics. 73.
https://buescholar.bue.edu.eg/econ/73

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business Administration, Economics and Political
Science at BUE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics by an authorized administrator of BUE
Scholar. For more information, please contact bue.scholar@gmail.com.

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1746-8809.htm

Capital structure and political
connections: evidence from GCC
banks and the financial crisis

Capital
structure and
political
connections

Fatma Ahmed
Swansea University, Swansea, UK, and

David G. McMillan
University of Stirling, Stirling, UK

Received 13 March 2020
Revised 7 August 2020
11 January 2021
11 May 2021
Accepted 24 August 2021

Abstract
Purpose – This paper investigates the effect of political connections on the capital structure of banks before
and after the financial crisis in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper employs the natural experiment that the financial crisis offers
and uses a difference-in-differences model to investigate the effect of political connections on capital structure.
Capital structure is measured by the total debt to total assets ratio. Control variables include bank size, growth,
profitability, coverage ratio and volatility. The research sample includes all the banks in the GCC from 2005
to 2016.
Findings – The authors find that political connections negatively affect banks capital structure decisions. The
results contradict the claim that politically connected firms tend to sustain higher debt due to government
privilege and a lower chance of bankruptcy. Additionally, the results show that after the financial crisis,
politically connected banks de-lever more compared to non-connected counterparts. This could suggest that the
degree of support received by connected banks changes or that they exploit their retained earnings for
financing (individual country results, however, suggest that leverage increases in Qatar).
Originality/value – This paper provides several contributions. First, GCC countries present an interesting
and important area in which to study the relation between political connections and capital structure as it
represents a mix of newer markets that seek to attract investors and foreign capital. Second, to the best of our
knowledge, the present study is the first to examine the effect of the political connection and capital structure in
GCC region where royal families play a significant role, especially for banks. Third, our paper is the first to link
connections with leverage after the financial crisis in the banking sector. Moreover, our paper is the first to
investigate this phenomenon in the GCC countries using manually collected primary data.
Keywords GCC banks, Political connection, Capital structure
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
While the global financial crisis resulted in criticism for banks and their regulators, it also
presents an opportunity to examine questions on the interaction of banks with different
agents. In this paper, we consider the connection between political influence and bank
behaviour using the financial crisis as a natural break that will allow us to consider whether
banks benefit from such a connection. To do this, we examine the influence of political
connections on bank capital structure in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, where
over 50% of banks possess such a relation. One of the benefits that political connections are
argued to convey to a bank is preferential access to resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Moreover, given the extent to which banks are affected by external contingencies and
uncertainties, Hillman (2005) argues that to mitigate such uncertainty, they are likely to build
external ties (e.g. political connections through the board of directors). Such ties could provide
protection against major events, such as a crisis, through enhanced government financial
support.
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The value of political connections is well documented across a range of firm behaviour.
Within the literature, one strand investigates the influence of political connections on
corporate value (e.g. Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2008; Amore and Bennedsen, 2013). Further,
that directors of connected firm can bring benefits to their companies. Boubakri et al. (2012a)
find that connected firms have a lower cost of equity and enjoy preferential support from their
government. Brown and Dinc (2005) find that, during election years, government-owned
banks have greater lending portfolios compared to their non-connected counterparts.
Claessens et al. (2008) and Faccio (2006) document that political connections provide access to
financial markets and reduce the budget constraints of connected banks. Moreover, Faccio
(2006) and Blau et al. (2013) document a lower cost of borrowing for connected firms. Goldman
et al. (2008) suggest that connections add value to the connected firms stock following the
political appointment of a connected director in the US.
While there is a growing and extensive literature on the determinants of capital structure
in emerging markets, the literature on the effect of political connections on capital structure is
scant. A series of papers find that politically connected firms may have a higher level of debt.
Notably, several papers examine the behaviour of Malaysian firms, including Johnson and
Mitton (2003) who show that Malaysian politically connected firms sustain more debt and are
riskier than the non-connected firms. Fraser et al. (2006) suggest that there is a significantly
positive relation between leverage and political connection, while Bliss and Gul (2012) equally
show that politically connected firms are riskier with higher debt. This latter study also notes
that politically connected firms are more likely to report a loss, to have negative equity or to
be audited by a big audit firm compared to non-politically connected firms. In contrast,
Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Faccio (2006) argue that the result of political connections is to
make the firm be perceived as less risky as it is expected to be rescued by the appropriate
government or through IMF or World Bank financial assistance.
This paper aims to study the relation between political connections and the capital
structure of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) banks for the period from 2005 to 2016.
Specifically, we use the financial crisis to investigate the difference between connected and
non-connected banks through a difference-in-differences approach, which examines how
different groups respond to an event. The difference-in-differences technique models whether
the trend behaviour in the variable of interest between two groups diverges following an
identified event, while accounting for issues of endogeneity. The financial crisis acts as a
natural event around which banks risk-taking behaviour might change. Therefore, we can
examine whether political connections affect the capital structure of GCC banks and track
changes in leverage after the crisis. The results will shed light on whether political
connections benefit a bank during a crisis, where they may receive favourable treatment from
the government or whether the crisis, which impacts government finances, will result in
support being withdrawn.
This paper provides several novel contributions. First, GCC countries present an
interesting and important area to study the relation between political connections and capital
structure as it represents a mix of newer markets, such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi, against
more established markets, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. Moreover, such new
markets attract investors and foreign capital into the region (Naceur et al., 2008). Second,
within the GCC countries, a large role is played by the respective royal families, who control
major aspects of each country’s economy. With respect to banks, over 50% exhibit political
connections, with over 80% in Qatar and Oman. This provides a comparatively unique
setting in which to examine this question and is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to
examine political connections and capital structure in GCC banks. Third, our paper is the first
to link political connections with behaviour after the financial crisis in the banking sector.
In consideration of our results, we note that politically connected banks have higher debt
levels but are also larger with higher coverage ratios; however, they are less profitable than

non-connected banks. Our estimation results report some evidence that political connections
reduce leverage in GCC banks. More specifically, in the parallel trends model and after
controlling for country and year characteristics, we find political connections have a negative
and significant impact on capital structure (although some model specifications report a
negative but insignificant result). Of further interest, we also find a negative and significant
association between political connection and leverage during the crisis period. This suggests
that politically connected banks may receive more direct support and be expected to use
retained earnings and run-down assets built up during pre-crisis periods.
2. Theoretical background and literature review
2.1 Theoretical background
Political connections can have a crucial impact on firms and the growth of economies. In one
approach, resource dependence theory states that the need for connections is a function of the
dependence with which a firm is faced. Political connection is one mechanism by which
companies can survive financial, social and global pressures. To reduce this uncertainty,
firms appoint politicians to the board of directors. Resource dependence theory then identifies
the board of directors as affecting the provision and allocation of resources, risk behaviour
and performance. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that the board of directors play an
integrating role between the monitoring and securing of resources and work to identify
possible threats and opportunities in shaping long-term plans. Additionally, they build
external relations to strengthen the company. Firms trying to increase capital can invite
important customers and/or suppliers, and politician to their board to increase profitability
and decrease risk.
Moral hazard also partly explains the behaviour of large firms in general, and financial
institutions in particular, in terms of their risk behaviour. Notably, believing that, under the
“too-big-to-fail” principle, large financial firms will be rescued in times of crisis to avoid
systemic failure of the financial system. One of the most famous examples of this, is Bear
Stearns, the first too-big-to-fail bank, which was rescued by the US Federal Reserve. Such
bailout decisions by policy authorities or governments, could be influenced by political
factors. Equally, they may not necessarily provide support to all firms that are too big to fail
(e.g. comparing with Lehman Brothers in 2008). Thus, firms and banks may look to hedge
against crises by growing their political ties to capitalise on moral hazards, which can
motivate them to take even greater risks (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Mariathasan et al., 2014;
Kostovetsky, 2015). Hence, according to the resource dependency and moral hazard
arguments, hiring politicians to boards could reduce uncertainty and strengthen ties between
banks and royal families especially in the crisis time. This, in turn, is expected to have a
positive influence on the level of bank capital structure.
In a different tack, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) present an alternative explanation for
political connections, which they described as rent-seeking behaviour. Here, managers
extract additional compensation through cash wages or other means, such as capital budget
allocation. Akhigbe et al. (2017) argue that political connection and the separation of
ownership increase the agency problems that affect the value of publicly traded firms (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). Boubakri et al. (2012b) argue that there is anecdotal evidence that some
investors prefer companies with minimal political connections. For example, Mediaset SpA’s
shares dropped sharply after the resignation announcement of the Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi in 2011. According to agency theory, having politicians on the board of
directors does not help to add value to connected banks, due to the expropriation of minority
investors via more related-party transactions and more severe over-investment problems.
Therefore, according to the agency theory, having politicians on the board of directors could
limit the quality of capital structure decisions.
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2.2 Performance and political connections
It is believed that politically connected firms receive a variety of economic benefits across a
range of markets and especially in emerging countries. While our focus is on capital structure,
we briefly note other aspects of the general research area. To this end, Table 1 presents a nonexhaustive list of work that examines political connections across a range of countries and
methodologies with varying results. In considering common themes from this literature, a
sequence of papers examines the effects of political connections on firm value. Faccio (2006)
examines 20,000 firms across 47 countries and argues that the benefits depend upon the level
of corruption within the country and the political power of the connected politician. Cooper
et al. (2010) argue that subsequent stock returns are affected by links and financial
contributions to political campaigns in the US. Amore and Bennedsen (2013) examine political
connections and note a positive link between an elected politician and firm profitability in
Denmark.
In contrast, Bertrand et al. (2018) argue that politically connected firms are less profitable
in France. Baslandze (2018) examine a link between political connections and innovation in
Italy, noting that more connected firms are likely to be less innovative. Faccio and Parsley
(2009) report that the death of a politician leads to a decline in stock market values for
connected firms. Diwan and Chekir (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2017) consider Egypt at the
time of the 2011 revolution. The former study finds that, in general, connected firms are less
efficient and have higher debt, while the latter study finds that different public
demonstrations affect the valuation of companies linked to different political factions.
Work explores the effect of political connections on strategic issues, such as preferential
access to finance from government (e.g. Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaia and Mian, 2005), the
link between political connections and firm value (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003;
Goldman et al., 2008) and on political connection and performance (e.g. Fan et al., 2007;
Fisman, 2001). However, there is little research on the impact of political links to the banking
sector (exceptions include Abdelsalam et al., 2017; Hung et al., 2017; Carretta et al., 2012; Pan
and Tian, 2018). Khwaja and Mian (2005) argue that politically connected firms could obtain
loans from banks by threatening and bribing bank officers.
The above research identifies that the effect of political connections is ambiguous.
Carretta et al. (2012) argue that political connections could have a negative impact on
performance, loan quality, general bank risk and efficiency. They find that politically
connected banks perform poorly compared to other banks. Abdelsalam et al. (2017) in a study
across eleven countries suggest that politically connected banks are less efficient than nonpolitically connected banks. In contrast, Faccio (2006) argues that politically connected banks
are more likely to be bailed out during times of crisis and may have superior access to the
resources. As noted, according to resource dependency theory, hiring politicians on boards
could reduce uncertainty and strengthen ties between the bank and government that can
have a positive influence on bank value and performance [1].
2.3 Capital structure and political connections
As an overarching issue, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that an important area of research
is the effect of institutions on capital structure decisions. Equally, Stearns and Mizruchi (1993)
and Johnson and Mitton (2003) argue that the board of directors in banks and other financial
institutions have a significant impact on capital structure decisions. Likewise, Smith (2016)
argues that firms may alter capital structure in response to political pressure. Political
connections can influence those decisions such that connected firm may gain privilege that
allows them to sustain more debt. Following this, a range of work provides supportive
evidence for this view (see, e.g. Lopez-Iturriaga, 2005; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fraser et al.,
2006; Bliss and Gul, 2012; Diwan and Schiffbauer, 2018). Diwan and Schiffbauer (2018) find
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that politically connected firms receive larger loans than non-connected firms. LopezIturriaga (2005) investigates the determinants of debt from an institutional perspective for
several developed countries and using fixed panel analysis finds that the capital structure
decision is affected by both firm characteristics and institutional factors [2] The study notes
the importance of understanding the institutional context of each country. In a similar vein,
Borisova et al. (2015) use a cross-country analysis of listed firms in 43 countries and find that
government ownership has a significantly positive effect on firm debt. Likewise, the results of
both Bliss and Gul (2012) and Boubakri et al. (2008) confirm the view that politically connected
firms have a higher leverage ratio. Khwaja and Mian (2005) study the lending behaviour of
banks in Pakistan, compiling a sample of 90,000 loan items that covers two elections, and
indicate that politically connected firms have greater access to credit from state-owned
banks. Brown and Dinc (2005) investigate interventions in failing banks. The result show that
politicians use banking regulation to favour preferred banks and discipline others.
As noted above, intrinsic to this, is the idea of the riskiness of connected firms. Faccio
(2010), examining 47 countries, documents that leverage is higher in connected firms. Such
firms also enjoy lower taxation and greater market power. Connected firms also exhibit lower
profitability and market valuation. Several researchers argue that evidence of such causality
is more prominent in crisis times. Acemoglu et al. (2016) explore the effect of political
connections on banks value following the announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for
Treasury Secretary in November 2008, a period associated with the financial crisis. The
study, consisting of all financial firms trading on the NYSE or Nasdaq, finds that the
announcement produces abnormal returns. Chekir and Diwan (2014) exploring crony
capitalism in Egypt and its effect on firm performance, consider politically connected and
non-connected firms before and after the 2011 revolution. The study finds that connected
firms are less efficient than unconnected firms. Capital is misallocated, and politically
connected firms borrow more than non-politically connected firms. Equally, Belghitar et al.
(2019) note that political connections allow firms to enjoy higher leverage, although investors
receive less protection. Political connections can also confer preferential treatment for banks.
In Ukraine, Baumat et al. (2008) find politically connected investment banks have a higher
chance to obtain contracts to advise the government. Moreover, connected banks have a
significantly lower interest rate margin and higher capitalization compared with nonconnected banks.
However, set against this, several researchers argue that politically connected banks are
less levered compared to non-connected counterparts. Braun and Raddatz (2010) exploit a
dataset of the names of politicians, cabinet members, financial sector supervisors and central
bank governors from the Country Reports of the Economist Intelligence Unit and Central
Bank Publications in 154 countries over 10 years. They highlight the critical role of banks in
allocating credit. The study finds evidence that when former high-ranking politicians become
bank directors, connected firms tend to be less levered and have less risk. Moreover, at a
country level, political connections are strongly negatively correlated with economic
development. Recently, Khaki and Akin (2020) investigate the effect of government
ownership on the capital structure in 329 non-financial firms for the period between 2009 and
2017 in the GCC and find a negative effect of state ownership on capital structure.
Despite the above research, there remains little understanding on the effect of political
connection on lenders (Hung et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
investigate the effect of political connections on the capital structure of banks in GCC
countries. Therefore, conducting this research will present additional insight in the behaviour
of emerging countries and notably whether such connections result in higher or lower
leverage, for which an ongoing debate remains. By manually collected primary data from
annual reports, official and other websites, we seek to investigate the effect of political
connection on the GCC banks’ capital structure before and after the financial crisis.
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3. Econometric methodology: difference-in-differences
To investigate the effect of political connections on firms’ leverage, we use the difference-indifferences (DID) approach, which compares a control and treatment group following an event.
Obenauer and von der Nienburg (1915) first use the DID approach to investigate the effects of a
minimum wage in the USA. The DID approach attempts to mimic a natural experiment, which
in the realm of economics and finance are hard to design. The empirical strategy of the DID
approach is to examine the behaviour (referred to as trends in the DID methodology) of two
groups. One group acts as the control, while the second (treatment) group is exposed to a
specific factor. The behaviour of these groups (parallel trends) is compared before and after an
exogenous event. In our context, the control group in non-politically connected firm, the
treatment group is politically connected firms, and the event is the financial crisis, which
provides a unique point to consider the changing nature of the relation between leverage and
political connections. Thus, we examine whether there is a change in behaviour when
comparing politically connected and unconnected firms before and after the crisis.
Using DID allows examination of the causal effect of political connection on capital
structure. This is because it is difficult to examine observable firm characteristics when
considering the role of political connections that can be personal (Gomez and Jomo, 1997) and
often predate any connections with the specific firm, i.e. the connection does not arise through
the firm but personal relationships (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The DID approach provides
an empirical way to consider the differences between connected and non-connected firms by
allowing examination of the mean difference (parallel trends) of the two groups of banks.
Specifically, we can use the event (financial crisis) to examine whether path taken by each
group changes after the event. Thus, by utilising the DID parallel trend model, we can
examine the effect of political connection before and after the financial crisis.
The general form of the DID approach is based on the following equation where we
investigate if both groups (politically and non-politically connected firms) have the same
trend before and after the treatment (crisis). The general parallel trends regression is:
Yt ¼ β0 þ β1 *½Time þ β2 *½Intervention þ β3 *½Time*Intervention þ β4 *½Covariates þ εt
(1)
The study applies a difference-in-differences model using panel data for six countries to
examine the effect of the political connection on banks’ capital structure, while controlling for
bank, country and time characteristics to ensure robust results. Thus, we estimate:
Yit ¼ αt þ β1 Di *before þ β2 Di *after þ

q
X

β3 xit *Di þ ηit

(2)

j¼q

where Yit is bank leverage i at time t, Di is a political connection indicator that is equal to one if
bank i is connected and zero otherwise, xi is a vector of bank characteristics, αt is a time fixed
effect and ηit an error term. We consider short- and long-run analysis by utilising a three-year
window for before and after the financial crisis (excluding the financial crisis years of 2007,
2008 and 2009). These are denoted as before and after in the above regression (we only show
one dummy here for simplicity). Thus, we have six dummies that correspond to the first,
second and third years before and after the crisis. These time dummies interact with the
treatment dummy (political connection). To consider whether there is a causal relation
between political connection and banks leverage, we can note whether the interaction
between the after-crisis years and the treatment dummy are significant.
Additionally, we interact the bank covariates with year and country dummies to estimate
the effect of political connections and the financial crisis on the determinants of capital
structure. Thus, our regression model becomes:

Yit ¼ αt þ β1 Di þ β2 At þ β3 Di At þ

q
X
j¼q

β4 xit *Di þ

q
X

β5 xit *Di *At þ ηit

(3)

j¼q

The terms are as defined under equation (2), while in addition At is a dummy variable for the
financial crisis that is equal to one for 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise. The coefficient β1
measures the difference in the leverage of politically connected and non-connected banks, β2
captures the banks’ leverage response to the crisis relative to pre-crisis, while β3 is the
interaction between the crisis and political connection dummies. The coefficients associated
with β4 show how politically connected banks’ leverage responds to capital structure related
variables relative to the non-connected banks. To investigate the effects of political
connections and the financial crisis, the coefficients associated with β5 measure the effect of
banks-specific factors on capital structure over the financial crisis period.
Additionally, as a robustness check we estimate the two-way fixed effects regression
model:
q
q
X
X
β4 xit *Di þ
β5 xit *Di *At þ ηit
(4)
Yit ¼ αt þ Ci þ β2 At þ β3 Di At þ
j¼q

j¼q

where αt and Ci are time and bank fixed effects. We do not include the individual political
connection dummy variable as the two ways fixed effects account for unobserved crosssectional heterogeneity across banks. Other terms remain as defined under equation (3).

4. Data
This paper seeks to examine the impact of political connection on the capital structure in GCC
banks. Our definition of connections follows Faccio (2006), among others, where a company is
connected with a politician if one of the company’s large shareholders or top officers is (a) a
member of parliament (MP); (b) a minister or the head of state; (c) closely related to a top
official. Political connection information and affiliation concerning royal families and
parliament members is collected from government and media websites, while the Orbis
database is used to obtain information about board of directors in GCC banks. Additionally,
political connections are traced by examining whether a given board of the director is a
member of the royal family or currently a parliament member or if a director’s family member
is a current parliament member. The political connections (PC) series is then constructed as a
dummy variable equal to one if a bank is politically connected and zero otherwise.
Our initial data set, which includes both politically connected and non-connected banks is
177 banks over the period from 2005 to 2016. The banks are then matched with financial
information on earnings per share, asset growth and monthly stock prices. Banks that did not
have any financial information are dropped, which gives an unbalanced final sample of 117
banks and 1,404 bank-year observations.
In Qatar, where royal family members have been in control of the banking sector since the
late 1980s, approximately 84% of the banking sector is politically connected. In Oman, from
the mid-2000s, royal family members and parliament members entered the business sector.
Mustahil al Ma’aahani (Sultan Qaboos’s maternal uncle) has chaired Dhofar International
Development and Muscat bank (Kamrava et al., 2016). In the banking sector, 86% of the
banks are politically connected. In the case of Bahrain, 65% of banks are politically
connected. Regarding the Kuwaiti banking sector, the children of the current ruler are
involved in the banking sector. Among the most prominent royal members is the former
emir’s daughter Hussa bint Saad (chair of the Arab Businesswomen’s Council and a board
member of Ithmaar Bank) (Kamrava et al., 2016). For the banking sector in Saudi Arabia and
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the United Arab of Emirates, the numbers of politically connected firms are relatively low
compared with the other countries, at 59 and 65%, respectively.
The dependent variable, leverage, is given by the total debt to total assets ratio. The
literature has established a range of explanatory variables in determining capital structure,
including profitability, risk, coverage ratio and market to book ratio (Rajan and Zingales,
1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Zeitun et al., 2017; Antoniou et al., 2008;
Ebrahim et al., 2014). Here, we consider size as measured by the natural logarithm of the
market capitalization (see, for example, Fama and French, 2002; Fama and Jensen, 1983),
growth as given by the stock price to book value ratio, profitability as measured by the
return on assets (ROA), the coverage ratio as a measure of a company’s ability to cover debt
obligations with its assets after all liabilities have been satisfied and volatility is a measure of
market risk and calculated from the standard deviation of day-to-day logarithmic historical
price changes (Frank and Goyal, 2009). These definitions are restated in Appendix for
clarity.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 2 and 3 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis.
Table 2 presents statistics for the pooled sample and shows that 70% of our sampled banks
exhibit political connections. The numbers represent time-series averages of the annual crosssectional mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for each variable. The
table shows that mean of the capital structure measure is 6.08% and ranges from 1% to
23.39%. The mean of ROA, as a measure of profitability, is 2.7% with a standard deviation of
5.8% and a range between 35.60% and 46.31%. The mean market capitalization (size, $m’s)
is 9,655 with a maximum of 243,450 and a minimum of only 1.96. The average of volatility is
37.1 with a maximum of 311.5 and a minimum of 0. The volatility factor has the largest
standard deviation in the sample at 26.05. The mean of market to book ratio is 1.816% with a
maximum of 21.12% and a minimum of 0.03%. The mean of the asset coverage ratio
is 141.7%.

Variables

Table 2.
Descriptive statistics

(2)
Mean

(3)
SD

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

(6)
Variance

(7)
Skewness

(8)
Kurtosis

CS
6.080
3.350
1.000
23.39
11.22
0.43
3.09
Size
9,655
20,782
1.960
243,450
4.3
4.62
33.15
Growth
1.816
1.647
0.0345
21.12
2.71
4.70
39.12
PC
0.707
0.455
0
1
0.207
0.90
1.827
ROA
2.714
5.844
46.31
35.60
34.14
0.23
18.81
COV
141.7
1,373
0.754
21,185
1,883,939
13.04
179.11
VOL
37.08
26.05
0
311.5
678.5
2.46
18.84
Note(s): This table provides descriptive information on the variables: CS: denoted for capital structure
measures by Total debt to total assets ratio, Total Debt\Total Assets, of bank i in year t. Size: Total current
market value of all of a company’s outstanding shares stated in the pricing currency. Growth: Ratio of the stock
price to the book value per share. Calculated as: Price to Book Ratio 5 Last Price/Book Value per Share. PC: As
defined, the variable PC is a dummy variable 1 if the bank is politically connected, 0 otherwise. ROA: Indicator
of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets, in percentage. Return on assets gives an idea as to how
efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Calculated as: (Trailing 12M Net Income/
Average Total Assets) * 100. COV: is a coverage ratio, which is a measure of a company’s ability to cover debt
obligations with its assets after all liabilities have been satisfied. Calculated as: [(Book Value of Total Assets –
Total Intangible Assets) – (Current Liabilities – Short-term Borrowings)]/Total Debt Outstanding. VOL:
Measure of the risk of price moves for a security calculated from the standard deviation of day-to-day
logarithmic historical price changes

(1)
N

(2)
Mean

(3)
SD

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

Politically connected firms
CS
703
Size
709
Growth
705
ROA
674
COV
692
VOL
593

6.262
9,905
1.850
2.261
177.3
35.00

3.149
22,187
1.652
5.364
1,621
23.94

1.031
1.960
0.137
46.31
0.754
0

23.39
243,450
21.12
27.27
21,185
298.1
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Non-politically connected firms
CS
284
5.628
3.771
1.000
18.47
Size
290
9,043
16,881
3.263
116,700
Growth
285
1.733
1.633
0.0345
17.72
ROA
273
3.832
6.769
18.20
35.60
COV
280
53.87
202.8
1.309
2,030
VOL
252
40.14
22.76
2.966
127.5
Note(s): This table provides descriptive information on the variables: CS: denoted for capital structure
measures by Total debt to total assets ratio, Total Debt/Total Assets, of bank i in year t. Size: Total current
market value of all of a company’s outstanding shares stated in the pricing currency. Growth: Ratio of the stock
price to the book value per share. Calculated as: Price to Book Ratio 5 Last Price/Book Value per Share. PC: As
defined, the variable PC is a dummy variable 1 if the bank is politically connected, 0 otherwise. ROA: Indicator
of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets, in percentage. Return on assets gives an idea as to how
efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Calculated as: (Trailing 12M Net Income/
Average Total Assets) * 100. COV: is a coverage ratio, which is a measure of a company’s ability to cover debt
Table 3.
obligations with its assets after all liabilities have been satisfied. Calculated as: [(Book Value of Total Assets –
Descriptive statistics
Total Intangible Assets) – (Current Liabilities – Short-term Borrowings)]/Total Debt Outstanding. VOL: for politically and nonMeasure of the risk of price moves for a security calculated from the standard deviation of day-to-day
politically
logarithmic historical price changes
connected banks

Table 3 separates the summary statistics between politically connected and non-connected
banks. On average politically connected firms are slightly larger than non-politically
connected banks. The average level of leverage in connected banks (6.26) is higher than for
non-connected banks (5.63). This could be indicative evidence for higher leverage in
politically connected banks (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Diwan and Chekir, 2012). Equally,
connected banks have a substantially higher coverage ratio (177.3) compared to nonconnected banks (53.87) in order to support the higher debt. Similarly, the growth ratio is
higher in politically connected banks. Conversely, profitability is higher in non-politically
connected banks (3.83 compared to 2.26 for connected banks), which is in line with Faccio
(2010) [3].
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients between leverage and bank-specific variables.
The correlations between leverage and size, growth and political connection variables are
positive and significant, while the correlation with volatility and profit are negative and
significant (the correlation with coverage is negative but not significant). Again, this supports
the view that leverage is higher in connected banks. Between the explanatory variables, we
see a significant positive correlation between size and growth and growth and profit and a
significant negative correlation between profit and volatility and profit and political
connection.
5. Empirical results
To examine the difference-in-differences (DID) results, we first run the parallel trends
regression, equation (2), including interaction effects between the factors and the political
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CS

VOL

Size

Growth

ROA

COV

PC

CS
1
VOL
0.114**
1
Size
0.175***
0.0605
1
Growth
0.103**
0.0641
0.446***
1
ROA
0.276***
0.0915*
0.0335
0.199***
1
COV
0.0522
0.0257
0.0135
0.0195
0.0128
1
PC
0.102**
0.0441
0.0186
0.0333
0.124***
0.0328
1
Note(s): *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
CS: denoted for capital structure measures by Total debt to total assets ratio, Total Debt\Total Assets, of bank i
in year t. Size: is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization (total current market value of all a company’s
outstanding shares stated in the pricing currency). Growth: Ratio of the stock price to the book value per share.
Calculated as: Price to Book Ratio 5 Last Price/Book Value per Share. PC: As defined, the variable PC is a
dummy variable 1 if the bank is politically connected, 0 otherwise. ROA: Indicator of how profitable a company
is relative to its total assets, in percentage. Return on assets gives an idea as to how efficient management is at
using its assets to generate earnings. Calculated as: (Trailing 12M Net Income/Average Total Assets) * 100.
COV: is a coverage ratio, which is a measure of a company’s ability to cover debt obligations with its assets
after all liabilities have been satisfied. Calculated as: [(Book Value of Total Assets – Total Intangible Assets) –
Table 4.
(Current Liabilities – Short-term Borrowings)]/Total Debt Outstanding. VOL: Measure of the risk of price
Correlation matrix: C
structure determinants moves for a security calculated from the standard deviation of day-to-day logarithmic historical price changes

connection variable. Table 5 presents the results that compares the trend in leverage for
politically connected and non-connected banks in the short- and long-run, controlling for year
and country effects. The first column shows the interaction between the treatment and the
time dummy one year before and one year after the financial crisis. The results show that the
coefficient before the financial crisis is insignificant, while it becomes significant after the
crisis. Using the parallel trends model for the long-run by taking three years before and after
the crisis, the results show that the interaction between the year dummies and the treatment is
significant only in the furthest (first) year before the crisis and insignificant in the closer
(second and third) years. However, the results show the interaction between the treatment
and the year dummies are significant for the three years after the financial crisis. Thus, we
can say that the leverage ratios of the political and non-political banks were moving in the
same direction prior to the financial crisis but significantly differ after. Notably, after the
crisis, politically connected banks reduce their leverage in comparison to nonconnected banks.
Table 6 presents the results of equation (3), which is based on a pooled regression where
we consider three models to allow for time and country effects. In all the models, standard
errors are robust and clustered at the bank level to control for serial correlation in the
residuals. The first model (Model 1) reports the results of a basic version of equation (3), Model
2 augments this by including time dummies, while Model 3 additionally includes country
dummies. In Model 1, the results reject the view that politically connected banks hold
significantly higher levels of debt. Indeed, the political connection dummy (β1) is negative,
indicating lower debt levels but is statistically insignificant. However, the results do show
that politically connected banks significantly reduce gearing during the crisis period
compared to non-connected banks. The results for Model 2, which introduces controls for
time effects, remain similar to those for Model 1, with an insignificant political connections
dummy and a significantly negative interaction between political connections and the crisis.
In Model 3, we control for both time and country characteristics, the results now do show that
political connections lead to a significantly lower level of leverage once controlling for other
factors. Again, in the crisis period, the results support the view that politically connected
banks de-lever compared to non-connected banks.

Variables

(1)
PTA_Short

PC 3 2005
PC 3 2006
PC 3 2007
1.485 (0.911)
PC 3 2011
2.232*** (0.588)
PC 3 2012
PC 3 2013
Size 3 PC
0.507*** (0.0969)
COV 3 PC
0.000196*** (6.89e–05)
ROA 3 PC
0.175*** (0.0491)
VOL 3 PC
0.0479*** (0.00917)
Growth 3 PC
0.0402 (0.134)
2005
–
2006
0.390 (0.468)
2007
0.743 (0.944)
2008
1.522** (0.663)
2009
1.102 (0.830)
2010
0.885 (0.680)
2011
0.631 (0.718)
2012
0.592 (0.665)
2013
0.681 (0.668)
2014
0.467 (0.663)
2015
0.193 (0.716)
2016
0.0895 (0.690)
Bahrain
–
Kuwait
0.532 (1.070)
Oman
1.425 (1.103)
Qatar
2.935*** (1.101)
Saudi Arabia
1.893 (1.187)
UAE
1.700 (1.120)
Constant
6.783*** (1.240)
Observations
777
R-squared
0.213
Note(s): Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

(2)
PTA_Long
2.013* (1.032)
1.056 (0.955)
1.782 (1.303)
2.658*** (0.625)
1.222** (0.591)
2.343*** (0.668)
0.545*** (0.0974)
0.000201*** (6.90e–05)
0.169*** (0.0493)
0.0470*** (0.00910)
0.106 (0.162)
–
0.663 (0.618)
0.0978 (1.042)
0.550 (0.901)
0.479 (1.037)
0.957 (1.035)
0.197 (1.067)
1.498 (0.920)
1.615* (0.970)
0.472 (0.926)
0.720 (0.939)
0.993 (0.899)
–
0.532 (1.059)
1.329 (1.103)
3.073*** (1.100)
2.034* (1.186)
1.771 (1.117)
7.471*** (1.373)
777
0.223

In the estimated models, the evidence for the other variables shows that larger politically
connected banks hold more debt. For politically connected banks, debt is negatively
associated with coverage ratio, profitability and volatility relative to non-connected banks.
However, we find no evidence of differences in the relations between growth opportunities
and leverage. The results emphasise the importance of the profitability and debt association
in a crisis time. The results show profitable politically connected banks depend less on debt
compared to non-politically connected banks during the crisis.
5.1 Robustness check
Table 7 shows the results of equation (4) estimated using both a one-way and two-way fixed
effects model. The first column reports the results based on one-way (firm) fixed effects,
which clusters the standard errors at the firm-level. The key (difference-in-differences)
variable is, again, strongly significant and negative suggesting that politically connected
firms exhibit less debt in the crisis period relative to the non-politically connected banks. Of
the other variables, only the coverage ratio exhibits a significant effect on the capital
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(1)
Variables

(2)
Year control

PC
1.356 (1.259)
1.040 (1.298)
Crisis
0.664 (0.489)
Pc 3 Crisis
0.543** (0.222)
1.198* (0.616)
COV 3 PC
0.000203*** (4.10e–05) 0.000210*** (4.79e–05)
Size 3 PC
0.441*** (0.110)
0.425*** (0.112)
ROA 3 PC
0.137*** (0.0455)
0.136*** (0.0480)
VOL 3 PC
0.0269*** (0.00864)
0.0306*** (0.00900)
Growth 3 PC
0.0990 (0.112)
0.138 (0.151)
Size 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.0331 (0.153)
0.0222 (0.152)
Cov 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.00318 (0.00464)
0.00312 (0.00465)
ROA 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.159** (0.0795)
0.162* (0.0820)
VOL 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.0215 (0.0132)
0.0236 (0.0144)
Growth 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.661 (0.417)
0.591 (0.429)
–
2005
2006
0.00632 (0.469)
2007
1.028 (0.800)
2008
0.965 (0.802)
2009
0.784 (0.858)
2010
0.283 (0.725)
2011
0.0113 (0.748)
2012
0.0176 (0.717)
2013
0.0140 (0.718)
2014
0.893 (0.718)
2015
0.787 (0.783)
2016
0.491 (0.762)
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Table 6.
Constant
5.889*** (0.723)
5.484*** (0.959)
Effect of crisis and the
Observations
777
777
relations between
R-squared
0.154
0.167
capital structure and
political connection in Note(s): Robust and clustered at bank level standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
GCC banks

(3)
Country and year control
4.608** (1.765)
1.137* (0.594)
0.000185*** (6.96e–05)
0.920*** (0.190)
0.140*** (0.0428)
0.0280*** (0.00887)
0.0348 (0.145)
0.0218 (0.137)
0.000281 (0.00443)
0.133* (0.0675)
0.0197 (0.0131)
0.360 (0.414)
–
0.205 (0.476)
0.696 (0.781)
0.862 (0.740)
0.708 (0.857)
0.407 (0.724)
0.0330 (0.752)
0.0159 (0.701)
0.221 (0.716)
0.640 (0.708)
0.600 (0.760)
0.325 (0.738)
–
0.386 (1.007)
0.429 (1.120)
3.924*** (1.224)
2.940** (1.360)
2.506** (1.202)
7.365*** (1.361)
777
0.257

structure decision comparing connected and non-connected banks. The second model
augments the first through the inclusion of year dummies. Again, the difference-indifferences variable that consider the effect of political connections remains both significant
and negative. This confirms that politically connected banks reduce gearing compared to
non-connected banks during the financial crisis [4].
The summary statistics and estimated results above suggest that politically connected
banks exhibit a higher level of debt than non-connected firms. This is consistent with the
literature such as Bliss and Gul (2012), Boubakri et al. (2008) and Fraser et al. (2006), among
others. But equally, politically connected banks have a noticeably larger coverage ratio,
suggesting that, in general, they can sustain this higher debt. It can also be observed that nonconnected banks are, on average, more profitable (as also noted by Bertrand et al., 2018). This
supports the view that connected banks benefit from such connections, see for example,
Boubakri et al. (2012a). Of particular importance, our results reveal that while the general
trend in leverage for connected and non-connected banks was the same prior to the crisis,

Variables

(1)
Fixed

o.PC
–
Pc 3 Crisis
0.611*** (0.187)
COV 3 PC
6.43e–05* (3.66e–05)
Size 3 PC
0.592** (0.246)
ROA 3 PC
0.0511* (0.0263)
VOL 3 PC
0.00422 (0.00467)
Growth 3 PC
0.00660 (0.0507)
Size 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.00871 (0.107)
Cov 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.00407*** (0.000928)
ROA 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.0292 (0.0401)
VOL 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.000632 (0.00722)
Growth 3 PC 3 Crisis
0.279 (0.318)
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Constant
3.459*** (1.238)
Observations
777
R-squared
0.047
Number of IDC
106
Note(s): Robust and clustered at bank level standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

(2)
Two-ways fixed

Capital
structure and
political
connections

–
0.978** (0.487)
5.75e–05 (3.60e–05)
0.249 (0.247)
0.0355 (0.0232)
0.00119 (0.00456)
0.104 (0.0761)
0.00619 (0.107)
0.00386*** (0.000983)
0.0251 (0.0418)
0.000777 (0.00778)
0.302 (0.331)
0.459 (0.286)
0.618 (0.508)
0.532 (0.359)
0.600 (0.454)
0.137 (0.381)
0.0106 (0.404)
0.295 (0.398)
0.478 (0.422)
0.676 (0.417)
0.809* (0.420)
0.594 (0.423)
Table 7.
4.814*** (1.240)
Effect of Crisis and the
777
Relation between
0.099
Capital Structure and
106
Political Connection in
GCC Banks using
Fixed Effect Modelling

following the crisis, there is evidence that connected banks de-levered compared to nonconnected banks. Moreover, during the crisis period, there is strong evidence to suggest that
connected banks significant reduced debt. This indicates a change in the support for
politically connected banks, perhaps with direct capital injections and a reduction is their
access to debt [5]. Our results are also consistent with the resource dependency view whereby
political connections lead to higher debt levels as such connections reduce firm uncertainty.
But during the crisis, agency considerations might dominate, and firms seek to de-lever.

6. Summary and conclusion
The effect of political connections on a range of firm behaviour is an important and ongoing
topic. This paper contributes to this literature by examining the relation between political
connections and capital structure in GCC banks. Existing evidence suggests that connected
banks typically have higher debt ratios, while there is debate on whether such connections
make banks safer (due to likely bailouts) or riskier (due to higher debt levels). We examine this
by collecting political connection and financial data for the period from 2005 to 2016.
We use difference-in-differences analysis and reveal that prior to the financial crisis
connected and non-connected banks exhibit a similar trend in leverage (there is evidence of a
negative relation between political connections and bank leverage although it is typically not
statistically significant). We also note that connected banks are larger, with a higher level of
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debt but with lower average profitability. This is consistent with resource dependency view
of political connections, which reduce the riskiness of a firm. However, as a key result, we see
that leverage for politically connected banks falls during the financial crisis. We consider a
range of model specifications, including one-way and two-way fixed effects to confirm the
robustness of this result. Individual country results support this result across all GCC
countries (although individual country regressions indicate that leverage increases in Qatar).
This de-levering is consistent with an agency view of political connections and suggests that
the financial crisis changed the nature of political connections.
In sum, the results of our quasi-experiment show that the presence of political connections
in GCC banks result in leverage reduction during the financial crisis. This is contrary to the
view that politically connected firms are more likely to sustain debt. Johnson and Mitton
(2003) and Boubakri et al. (2008) both argue that political connections in banks and financial
institutions have a significant impact on capital structure decisions, with such connections
giving privileges that allow for greater debt. Ebrahim et al. (2014) point out that firms
consider political connections as an insurance policy against major risks. The result that
banks de-lever during the crisis may suggest that GCC countries, as cash-rich countries,
engage in risk reduction during this period. This result is consistent with Ebrahim et al. (2014)
who find politically connected firms in Malaysia depend less on the debt in periods of
financial distress. Equally, it could be consistent with Johnson and Mitton (2003) who argue
that politically connected banks suffer more in distress periods as the exogenous shock
restricts government’s ability to provide privileges and subsidies.
Our findings are relevant for other studies analysing the implications of political
connections to firms. We contribute to understanding the impact of exogenous shocks on
financing and how political connections influence strategic decision-making. Our findings
provide several important implications for policymakers, investors and regulators in the GCC
countries. Notably, suggesting a degree of caution with respect to governments in regard of
the amount of support that they provide to avoid sending an erroneous signal to both
investors and markets, which may affect economic growth negatively in the long run. Indeed,
as the COVID-19 pandemic continues (at the time of writing), the results here suggest that
bank may receive a different level of support as other calls as made of each country’s finances.
Notes
1. Acemoglu et al. (2016) report that a favourable Treasury secretary announcement leads to higher
abnormal returns for US banks. Blau et al. (2013) show that politically connected firms have a higher
probability of receiving state aid after the financial crisis. Abdelsalam et al. (2017) show that higher
government ownership of banks in the MENA region leads to lower efficiency. Carretta et al. (2012)
argue that political connections for Italian banks has a negative effect on revenue and loan portfolio
quality but a positive effect on efficiency.
2. Austria, Germany, Japan, Belgium, France, Italy, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and
the USA.
3. We conduct tests of equality for the means of the series when separated according to political
connections. These tests indicate a significant difference for the leverage, profit and volatility series.
4. As a further robustness check, we consider the DID analysis for each individual country. For all the
GCC countries, except Qatar, there is strong evidence of a negative relation between political
connections and capital structure as reported above. Equally, in the crisis period there is further
evidence of de-levering, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Again, we see Qatar standing in
contrast with an increase in debt. There is some evidence, in general, that leverage in non-politically
connected firms increases during the crisis.
5. An overview of GCC banks and the financial crisis is given by Khamis et al. (2010).
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Appendix
Variable

Variable definition

CS
Size

Denoted for capital structure measures by total debt to total assets ratio
The natural logarithm of the market capitalization (total current market value of all a company’s
outstanding shares stated in the pricing currency)
Ratio of the stock price to the book value per share. Calculated as: Price to Book Ratio 5 Last Price/
Book Value per Share
PC refer to political connection and it is a dummy variable 1 if the bank is politically connected,
0 otherwise
Indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets, in percentage. Return on assets
gives an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Calculated
as: (Trailing 12M Net Income/Average total assets) * 100
It is a coverage ratio, which is a measure of a company’s ability to cover debt obligations with its
assets after all liabilities have been satisfied. Calculated as: [(Book value of total assets – total
intangible assets) – (current liabilities – short-term borrowings)]/Total debt outstanding
Measure of the risk of price moves for a security calculated from the standard deviation of day-today logarithmic historical price changes

Growth
PC
ROA
COV

Table A1.
Variable definitions

VOL
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